I study the e¤ects of anticipated in ‡ation on the macroeconomic performance and whether the …scal policy regime matters for such e¤ects. I construct a tractable framework with competitive search that can endogenously generate dispersion of prices, wealth and income. I prove and characterize the stationary equilibrium. Findings from quantitative analysis suggest that in ‡ation has non-trivial e¤ects on aggregate output, price levels, price dispersion, average wealth, and inequality of wealth, income and consumption. Income taxation has its distinctive e¤ects on the above variables, often to the opposite of the in ‡ation e¤ects. Moreover, the tax regime can alter the relationship between in ‡ation and wealth dispersion. Finally, in ‡ation can improve welfare when income taxation is imposed. The higher the tax rate, the more prominent the welfare-improving role of in ‡ation.
Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that price dispersion, wealth and income distributions prevail in the real economies. In the presence of such distributions, monetary and …scal policy is likely to have uneven impacts on households in an economy, which in turn can generate non-trivial e¤ects on real activities and welfare. In this paper, I construct a tractable framework with competitive search that endogenously generates dispersion of prices, wealth and income. I investigate the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation on various aspects of the macroeconomic performance, e.g. output, markups, price distribution, wealth dispersion, income inequality, consumption inequality and welfare. Furthermore, I study whether there is room for coordination of monetary and …scal policies, that is, whether the …scal policy regime a¤ects the relationships between in ‡ation and the aforementioned macro measures of interest.
In the model, households and …rms can trade in frictionless and frictional markets. The frictional market is characterized by competitive search, where households make tradeo¤s between the terms of trade and matching probabilities when choosing which submarket to participate in. Search is competitive in that both households and …rms take as exogenous the terms of trade and the matching probabilities across all submarkets. In equilibrium, a submarket that requires a higher payment per transaction o¤ers a higher quantity of goods in a transaction and also a higher probability for a buyer to be matched for a transaction. Households face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks on labor preferences, which lead to diverse decisions on consumption, labor supply, savings and trading strategies.
Competitive search is a key feature of this model and it o¤ers two important advantages: First, output responds to policy changes along both intensive and extensive margins. The former refers to the quantity of goods traded in a transaction and the latter is the volume of transactions. The extensive margin of output has rarely been studied in a heterogeneousagent context. Second, competitive search signi…cantly improves model tractability. Unlike the more commonly studied bilateral bargaining in a search environment, here individual traders cannot a¤ect any of the submarket speci…cations, i.e. terms of trade and matching probabilities, due to the competitive nature of the search process. Taking the trading speci…cations as given, a household need not consider the amount of money balance that its potential trading partner might have, when making its optimal decisions. Therefore, the household decision problem is independent of the endogenous money distribution, which greatly reduces the state space and renders the model tractable.
I characterize the household optimal decisions and prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium in the version of the model with constant money supply and zero income taxation. Then I consider money growth created by lump-sum money injections, as well as proportional income taxes. I provide analytical results on direct policy e¤ects on intensive and extensive margins. In particular, given the amount spent in a trade, in ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on the intensive margin and a positive e¤ect on the extensive margin. In contrast, income taxation has the exact opposite e¤ects, i.e. positive on the intensive margin and negative on the extensive margin. The amount that a household is willing to spend in a transaction is also a¤ected by policy, which creates an indirect channel for policy to in ‡uence the two margins. I further investigate the policy e¤ects through quantitative analysis. The model generates a rich set of results regarding the e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation. The results are consistent with some of the evidence from recent empirical literature, suggesting that the trading frictions can be important in helping reconcile empirical observations on the macroeconomic performance.
The key …ndings from the numerical exercises are the following: First, in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on aggregate output, consumption inequality, average price and price dispersion. In the meanwhile, in ‡ation reduces average wealth and income inequality. Second, income taxation has a negative e¤ect on output, average price, and a positive e¤ect on average wealth and income inequality. Taxation strengthens the negative relationship between in ‡ation and income inequality. Moreover, taxation can alter the relationship between in ‡ation and wealth inequality. At lower tax rates, in ‡ation is a regressive wealth tax. At intermediate tax rates, there can be a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and wealth dispersion. At higher tax rates, in ‡ation is a progressive wealth tax. Finally, in ‡ation can be welfare-improving when income taxes are imposed. The higher the tax rate, the stronger the positive welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation. Therefore, the model suggests that it is important to coordinate policies. The optimal in ‡ation rate is higher if the tax rate has been raised, and vice versa.
The framework developed here is based on Lagos and Wright (2005; henceforth LW) and Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011; henceforth MSS). The LW structure features quasi-linear preferences and alternating frictional and frictionless markets. It is a tractable monetary framework because the equilibrium money distribution is degenerate. 1 However, it does not provide insights on the distributional policy e¤ects. Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011) construct a tractable monetary environment with non-degenerate money distributions. Because of competitive search, the model has block recursivity, which refers to the model feature that individual decision problems are independent of the endogenous distributions. 2 Menzio, Shi and Sun characterize the stationary equilibrium by abstracting away from money growth.
To focus on the policy e¤ects without losing model tractability, I construct a model with key features of LW and MSS. With quasi-linear preferences, access to frictionless markets and competitive search, the model is block recursive even in the context of both monetary and …scal policies. In this model, money is the only store of value. However, in contrast to LW and MSS, money is the required medium of exchange in any market. But unlike a representative-agent structure, households still have incentives to hold money because they may need to save the unspent balances whenever they are not matched in a trade, or because they need to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks. This paper is closely related to the literature on the distributional e¤ect of monetary policy. This literature of heterogeneous-agent monetary economies can be roughly divided into two categories: with and without search frictions. In the models without search frictions, money is valued either because of the cash-in-advance constraint (Imrohorglu, 1992; Erosa and Ventura, 2002; Camera and Chien, 2011) or for precautionary purpose (Akyol, 2004; Wen, 2010; Dressler, 2011) . Because agents trade in Walrasian markets, these models are not able to generate equilibrium price dispersion. The search model is a natural environment to have dispersion of prices, e.g. Molico (2006) , Boel and Camera (2009) and Chiu and Molico (2010) . A common trading arrangement in these models is bilateral bargaining. In contrast, my model features competitive search, which not only allows for the extensive margin e¤ect but also signi…cantly improves tractability. Finally, none of the above literature examines whether the …scal regime is a factor in the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation, which is one of the two main considerations of my paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the physical model environment. Section 3 characterizes the monetary equilibrium and presents the theoretical results. Section 4 discusses theoretical policy e¤ects. Section 5 shows numerical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
A Uni…ed Macroeconomic Framework

The environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each time period consists of two sub-periods. The economy is populated by a measure one of ex ante identical households. Each household consists of a worker and a buyer. All households consume general goods in the …rst subperiod and special goods in the second sub-period. There are di¤erent types of special goods. Every period a household faces a random shock on consumption preference that determines which type of special goods (other than its own production goods) it can consume for the current period. Household members share income, consumption and labor cost. The preference of a household in a time period is
where y is consumption of general goods, q is consumption of special goods and l is labor input in a time period. The parameter 2 ; measures the random disutility per unit of labor. It is i.i.d. across households and over time, where 0 < < < 1. It is drawn from the probability distribution F ( ). The value of is realized at the beginning of every period, before any decisions are made. The functions u and U are twice continuously di¤erentiable and have the usual properties: u 0 > 0, U 0 > 0; u 00 < 0,
1) = 0; and u 0 (0) and U 0 (0) being large but …nite.
Households discount future with factor 2 (0; 1). All goods are perfectly divisible. They are also perishable and cannot be consumed across sub-periods. There is no insurance on income risks. Nor is borrowing or lending feasible. There is a …at object called money, which is perfectly divisible and can be stored without cost.
General goods are traded in perfectly competitive markets, called frictionless markets. Special goods are traded in frictional markets in the sense that there is random matching between buyers and sellers in such a market. The trading frictions are driven by household random demand for special goods. There is a measure one of competitive …rms. All households and …rms have free access to the frictionless and the frictional goods markets. Firms hire workers from households, who own equal shares of all …rms. The labor market is competitive and frictionless. Labor is hired at the beginning of a period and is used in production for both general and special goods. Each …rm can organize production and sales of the general goods and one particular type of special goods. Therefore, each …rm only hires workers who are specialized in producing that particular type of special goods, in addition to producing general goods. A …rm pays competitive wages and distributes pro…ts to the households. In a frictional market, …rms have free entry to a variety of submarkets, which di¤er in terms of trading protocols. A …rm chooses the measure of shops to operate in each submarket. The cost of operating a shop for one period is k > 0 units of labor. The cost of producing q units of special goods requires (q) units of labor, where is twice continuously di¤erentiable with the usual properties: 0 > 0, 00 0 and (0) = 0.
In each period, trading in the frictionless goods market takes place in the …rst subperiod, followed by trading in the frictional market in the second sub-period. 3 The worker of a household works for a …rm, while the buyer goes shopping in the goods markets. Trading in a frictional market is characterized by competitive search. Each submarket is characterized by (x; q; b; s), where (x; q) are the terms of trade and (b; s) are the respective matching probabilities for a buyer and a shop. Search is competitive in the sense that households and …rms take as given the characteristics of all submarkets, and choose which submarket to participate in. Buyers and shops are randomly matched in a pair-wise manner because households and …rms cannot coordinate. In equilibrium, free entry of …rms is such that the characteristics of submarkets are consistent with the speci…ed ones. The matching technology has constant returns to scale and is characterized by the matching function s = (b). As households and …rms choose which submarket to enter, the matching probabilities in each submarket becomes functions of the terms of trade (x; q), as is shown in (4). Therefore, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by (x; q). I impose the following assumption: I focus on steady state equilibria and suppress the time index throughout the paper. The per capita money stock is …xed at M for now. I will allow it to change over time later when I analyze policy e¤ects. I use labor as the numeraire of the model. In particular, let m denote the real value of a household's money balance at a particular point in time, where the label "real" means that m is measured in terms of labor units. I assume that m is the maximum real money balance that a household can carry across periods, where 0 < m < U 0 1
. Let w denote the normalized wage rate, which is the nominal wage rate divided by the money stock M . Then the dollar amount associated with a balance m is (wM ) m.
A …rm' s decision
In the frictionless market, a representative …rm takes the general-good price as given and chooses output Y to maximize pro…t. It takes Y units of labor to produce Y units of general goods. Let p be the price of general goods, measured in terms of labor units. In the frictional market, the …rm takes the terms of trade for each submarket, (x; q), as given and chooses the measure of shops, dN (x; q), to set up in each submarket. Recall that a shop is matched by a buyer with probability s (x; q). For a particular shop in the submarket, the operational cost is k units of labor and the expected cost of production is (q) s (x; q) units of labor. A shop's expected revenue is xs (x; q), where the revenue x is measured in labor units. The …rm's total pro…t in a period is
The …rst item on the right-hand side denotes the …rm's pro…t in the frictionless market and the second item its pro…t in the frictional market. Free entry of …rms implies that the …rm earns zero pro…t in the frictionless market and p = 1 in equilibrium.
The expected pro…t of operating a shop is
If this pro…t is strictly positive, the …rm will choose d N (x; q) = 1. However, this case will never occur in equilibrium under free entry. If this pro…t is strictly negative, the …rm will choose d N (x; q) = 0. If this pro…t is zero, the …rm is indi¤erent across various non-negative and …nite levels of dN (x; q). Thus, the optimal choice of dN (x; q) satis…es:
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. As is common in the competitive search literature, 4 I focus on equilibria where condition (2) also holds for submarkets not visited by any buyer. This implies that the …rm also earns zero pro…t in the frictional markets in equilibrium.
For all submarkets such that k < x (q), the submarket has dN (x; q) > 0, and (3) holds with equality. For all submarkets such that k x (q), the submarket has dN (x; q) = 0, in which case I set s = 1 and b = 0. Putting the two cases together, the matching probability for a particular shop is given by
The free-entry condition pins down the matching probabilities in a submarket as functions of the terms of trade. Indeed, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by the terms of trade, (x; q).
A household' s decision 2.3.1 Decision in the frictionless market
Let W (m; ) be a household's value at the beginning of a period with money balance m and the random realization . Given price p and the characteristics of all submarkets, a household maximizes its value by choosing consumption of general goods y 0, labor input l 0, the balance to spend in the frictional market z 0, and the savings h 0. If the household's buyer is matched with a shop in the frictional market, then the buyer spends z and the household carries h into the following period. Otherwise, the household carries a balance z + h into the following period. If the balance z + h contains …rm IOUs, the household redeems these IOUs for money and carries it to the next period. Thus z +h m. The dividend is paid to the household at the end of a period. In equilibrium = 0 because …rms earn zero pro…t.
The value W (m; ) satis…es the following Bellman equation:
s:t: py + z + h m + l:
The constraint in the above is a standard budget constraint. 5 The function V (z; h) is the household's value at the beginning of the second sub-period, i.e., before the frictional market opens. Because the analysis on the decisions of frictional trading is more involved, I will postpone fully characterizing V until the next section. In Lemma 3, I show that V is di¤erentiable and concave in z. For now, I take such information of V as given. Given U 0 > 0, the budget constraint must hold with equality and thus
where I have incorporated p = 1 in equilibrium. For now I assume that the choice of l is interior, which I will prove later. Using (6) to eliminate l in the objective function yields
The optimal choices must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions:
; and z 0 ; and z m h;
V h (z; h) ( ; and h 0 ; and h m z
where the all sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Given 0 < m < U 0 1
, it follows that for all 2 ; ,
Given p = 1 in equilibrium, condition (8) implies that the choice of y is always interior and satis…es
Clearly, the household's current money balance m does not a¤ect these optimal choices of y, z or h. Let the policy functions be y ( ), z ( ) and h ( ). Note that z ( )+h ( ) 0 for all 2 ; and that m m. Therefore, (6) and (11) imply that l (m; ) U 0 1 m > 0 for all (m; ). Given (7), the value function W is clearly continuous, di¤erentiable and Because both …at money and …rm IOUs can be used to purchase all goods, no particular type of goods are cash goods in this environment. This is in contrast with standard money search models, where goods traded in the frictional markets are considered cash goods. In these models, …at money must be used as a medium of exchange to overcome the lack of double coincidence of wants and record-keeping of individual traders. 9 linear in m:
where
The preceding exposition proves the following lemma:
The value function W is continuous and di¤erentiable in (m; ). It is also a¢ ne in m.
Decision in the frictional market
The household's decisions on frictional trading are non-trivial and deserve much attention. The household chooses whether to participate in the frictional market. If yes, then it chooses which submarket to enter and search for a trade. Given balances z and h, the household is faced with the following problem at the beginning of the second sub-period:
where q 0, x z and b (x; q) is determined by (4) . It is convenient to use condition (4) to eliminate q in the above objective function. Given linearity of W , the problem in (14) simpli…es to
The optimal choices satisfy the following …rst-order conditions 
where the two sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. It has been taken into account in condition (17) that b = 1 cannot be an equilibrium outcome. This is because b = 1 implies that s = 0. This further implies that …rms choose d N (z; q) = 1 and earn strictly positive pro…t, which violates free entry. Let the policy functions be x (z), b (z) and q (z), where q (z) is implied by condition (4):
If b (z) = 0, then the choices of x and q are irrelevant. In this case, the household chooses not to participate in the frictional submarket. Without loss of generality, I impose
It is obvious from (15) that the optimal choices are independent of z if the money constraint does not bind, i.e., x (z) < z. De…ne (q) (16) holds with equality. Then conditions (16) and (18) imply
Given q , using (18) to eliminate x in (17) yields
It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side of (20) is strictly increasing in b . Moreover, b > 0 exists and is unique if E ( ) satis…es
Given unique values of q and b , x is uniquely determined by
Therefore, if condition (21) holds, then x (z) = z for all z < x and x (z) = x for all z x . If condition (21) fails to hold, x (z) = z for all z 0. De…neẑ as the maximum value such that x (z) = z. Thusẑ = x if (21) holds andẑ = 1 otherwise.
In this environment, it is not necessary for the household to choose z higher than the amount that it plans to spend in the frictional market. Without loss of generality, I focus on the case x (z) = z in the rest of the analysis. In particular, consider z 2 [0;ẑ]. Given such z, the problem in (15) becomes
The value B (z) is the household's expected trade surplus. If b > 0, it must be the case that q > 0 and that the surplus from trade is strictly positive:
The optimal choice of b satis…es condition (17) given x = z.
Lottery choice. It is necessary to mention that the value function B (z) may not be concave in z because the objective function in (23) may not be jointly concave in its state and choice variables, (z; b). This objective function involves the product between the choice variable b itself and a function of b. Even if both of these two terms are concave, the product may not be jointly concave. Above all, it is unclear whether either of the two terms is a concave function of z, given that b is a choice variable and is yet to be determined. To make the household's value function concave, I introduce lotteries with regards to households' balances z, as is the case in Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011). In particular, lotteries are available every period immediately before trading in the frictional market takes place.
A lottery is characterized by (L 1 ; L 2 ; 1 ; 2 ). If a household plays this lottery, it will win the prize L 2 with probability 2 . The household loses the lottery with probability 1 , in which case it receives a payment of L 1 . There is a complete set of lotteries available. Given z, a household's optimal choice of lottery solves:
subject to
hold is better o¤ not playing any lottery, it is trivial to see that Figure 1 illustrates how the lottery can help make the value functionṼ (z) concave, even though the function B (z) has some strictly convex part. It is intuitive to see that a household will choose to play a lottery if it has a very low balance. As is shown in Figure   1 , for any balance z 2 (0; z 0 ), it is optimal for the household to participate in the lottery o¤ering the prize z 0 . The lottery makesṼ (z) linear whenever B (z) is strictly convex. The properties of z 0 are presented in part (iii) of Lemma 2. Recall the household's …rst-order condition (9) on the optimal choice of z. Given the lottery, the policy function z ( ) may not be unique because V has some linear segments. I focus on the symmetric equilibrium where households with the same realization of will choose the same value of z, whenever the optimal choice of z is not unique.
Properties of value and policy functions
Lemma 2 The value function B (z) is continuous and increasing in z 2 [0;ẑ]. The value functionṼ (z) is continuous, di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in z 2 [0;ẑ]. For z such that b (z) = 0, the value function B(z) = 0. In this case, the choice of q is irrelevant. There exists z > 0 such that b (z) > 0 if and only if there exists q > 0 that satis…es
Moreover, the following results hold: (i) The policy functions b (z) and q (z) are unique and strictly increasing in z. In particular, b (z) solves
Moreover, b (z) strictly decreases in E ( ) and q (z) strictly increases in E ( ); (ii) There exists
There exists z 0 > z 1 such that a household with z < z 0 will play the lottery with the prize
Lemma 2 summarizes the properties of the household's value and policy functions in the frictional market. According to part (i), the optimal choices of (q; b) are strictly increasing in z when the household chooses b > 0 to participate in frictional trading. In this case, the higher a balance the household spends, the higher a quantity it obtains and the higher the matching probability at which it trades. As a result, households endogenously sort themselves into di¤erent submarkets based on their balances to spend. For any given z, a higher value of E ( ) implies a lower matching probability for the buyer and a higher amount of goods to be purchased by the buyer. The intuition is the following: Given higher E ( ), it becomes more costly for …rms to hire labor. Firms respond accordingly by setting up fewer shops in the submarkets but increasing quantity produced per trade. This helps save the …xed cost of operating shops and steer more labor into production. All else equal, more shops in a submarket lead to a higher matching probability for a shop, which tends to increase a …rm's revenue. Thus the …rm can a¤ord to o¤er a higher quantity per trade, even though it requires a higher labor input. In this case, households face a lower matching probability for a buyer. Nevertheless, the households are compensated by an increase in the quantity per purchase.
Recall that V is the value of a household at the beginning of the second sub-period, before trading decisions are made. Given (12) , (15), (23) and (25), V is given by
Thus V is linear in h with
Then condition (10) implies that the optimal choice of h satis…es
where the two sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Given Lemma 1,Lemma 2 and conditions (30) and (31), it is trivial to derive the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The function V is continuous and di¤erentiable in (z; h). The function V ( ; h) is also increasing and concave in
Recall that the …rm's free entry to the frictionless market implies that p = 1. Also recall that the household's optimal choice of y is given by (11) . Given strict concavity of the function U and concavity of V in z, it is straightforward to obtain y 0 ( ) < 0 and
where h ( E ( )) + z ( E ( )) 2 (0; m). The above exposition leads to the following very intuitive lemma:
Lemma 4 (i) y 0 ( ) < 0, z 0 ( ) 0 and h 0 ( ) 0; (ii) l m (m; ) < 0 and l (m; ) < 0.
Stationary Equilibrium
De…nition 1 A stationary equilibrium consists of household values (W; B;Ṽ ; V ) and choices (y; l; z; h; (q; b) ; (L 1 ; L 2 ; 1 ; 2 )); …rm choices (Y; dN (x; q)); price p and wage rate w. These elements satisfy the following requirements: (i) Given the realizations of shocks, asset balances, general-good prices and the trading protocols of all frictional submarkets, a household's choices solve (7), (23), (25) and (29), which induce the value functions W (m; ), B(z),Ṽ (z) and V (z; h); (ii) Given prices and the trading protocols of all submarkets, …rms maximize pro…t and solve (2); (iii) Free entry condition: The expected pro…t of a shop in each submarket is zero, and the function s(x; q) satis…es (4); (iv) All labor markets, general-good markets and money markets clear; (v) Stationarity: All quantities, prices and distributions are time invariant; (vi) Symmetry: Households in the same idiosyncratic state make the same optimal decisions. 15
The above de…nition is self-explanatory. The labor-market-clearing condition implies that the equilibrium normalized wage rate w is determined by
I provide detailed formulas for the market-clearing conditions and the government transfer in Appendix D. Given the de…nition of the stationary equilibrium, I have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 A stationary equilibrium exists. It is unique if and only if the lottery choices According to Theorem 2, the frictionless markets are always active, while the frictional markets are not. A necessary condition for the frictional markets to be used is that condition (26) holds for some q > 0. This condition depends on the preferences and the production technology for special goods, the discount factor and the value of E ( ). Intuitively, if the utility derived from consuming special goods is too low, or if the production cost of special goods is too high, consumption of special goods can become too costly, especially considering the uncertainty involved in obtaining such goods. Similarly, if E ( ) is too high, then the cost of labor is high, which drives up the cost of producing special goods and suppresses the demand. These results are consistent with the …ndings of Camera (2000) . In a model without distributional components, Camera shows that the frictional markets are used in equilibrium when households can have su¢ ciently high expected consumption relative to the frictionless markets.
Policy E¤ects
I now analyze the e¤ects of monetary and …scal policies. Consider that the money stock per capita evolves according to M 0 = M , where is the money growth rate and M 0 is the money stock of the next period. Money growth is achieved by a lump-sum transfer from the government to the households, and vice versa for money contraction. The governmentalso imposes a proportional tax rate 2 (0; 1) on wage income. The government balances its budget every period. All tax revenues are redistributed from the government to the households in a lump-sum manner, together with the transfers made for money growth purposes. Transfers are made at the beginning of each period. All tax payments and transfers are made with money. The money market opens in the second subperiod of a period.
First, it is straightforward to show that @y ( ) =@ 0, which is simply an income e¤ect. Second, monetary and …scal policies directly a¤ect equilibrium trading strategies, i.e., the intensive margin q (z) and the extensive margin b (z) for a given balance z. Given the policies, all the results in Lemma 2 hold, except that the policy functions b (z) and q (z) are jointly determined by
instead of (27) and (28) . Then follows a proposition on policy e¤ects:
Part (i) summarize the e¤ects of proportional income taxes. A higher income tax rate makes households frugal on spending. For any given balance, a household chooses to visit a submarket that o¤ers a higher quantity of goods per trade, which is a positive e¤ect on the intensive margin. In such a submarket, a …rm's cost of production per trade is higher. Thus it reduces overall cost by setting up a smaller measure of shops in this submarket. This imposes a negative e¤ect along the extensive margin. The results in part (i) are intensive and extensive margin e¤ects of …scal policies. These are novel results in that current literature on search-theoretic models of money rarely analyzes the e¤ect of …scal policy on frictional trading.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 lists the monetary policy e¤ects on intensive and extensive margins. In particular, the real value of a money balance over time decreases with money growth. A household responds by sending its buyer to a submarket with a higher matching probability b, in order to increase the chance of spending money in the current period. In such a submarket, the matching probability for a shop is lower, which all else equal implies a lower pro…t for …rms. Zero pro…t condition requires that …rms must be compensated by 17 producing a lower quantity per trade. These results of monetary policy are standard and have been well-documented in the money search literature.
Numerical Results
I employ the following functional forms to simulate this economy: Strategy for computing the stationary equilibrium. To completely solve the equilibrium, one can …rst solve the optimization problems of …rms and households. After obtaining the policy functions from the aforementioned decision problems, one can derive the equilibrium wage rate, aggregate labor, aggregate output and the government transfer, using the formulas presented in Appendix D.
Policy functions. Figure 2 depicts the policy functions under various monetary and …scal policy regimes. A few observations follow immediately:
R1. The policy functions y ( ), z ( ) and h ( ) are decreasing in and b (z) and q (z) are increasing functions for z such that b (z) > 0. These results con…rm corresponding ones in Lemmas 2 and 4;
R2. Consider a given tax rate . For any given value of , in ‡ation (higher ) increases the transaction balance z ( ) and decreases savings h ( ). It has no e¤ect on y ( ). This is obvious from panels A and B for = 0, and panels C and D for = 0:2;
R3. Consider a given money growth rate . For any given value of , a higher tax rate decreases z ( ) and y ( ), but increases savings h ( ). This is obvious from panels A and C for = 0:995, and panels B and D for = 1:2;
R4. Neither the in ‡ation rate nor the tax rate has a signi…cant impact on the functions b (z) and q (z);
R5. The price of special goods in a frictional submarket, z=q (z), is generally an increasing function of the amount spent z.
The results in R2-R3 are intuitive. In ‡ation has no e¤ect on consumption of general goods, which is a standard result. All else equal, in ‡ation reduces the value of real money balances over time. Hence, the household chooses to save less and spend more on special goods. Moreover, all else equal, a higher tax rate makes it more costly to supply labor. As a result, the household saves more and becomes more frugal on spending.
Intensive and extensive margins. Policy a¤ects the intensive and extensive margins both directly, as summarized in Proposition 1, and indirectly through a¤ecting the choice of spendings z. In particular, given a household's choices of b and q can be expressed by b (z ( ; ) ; ) and q (z ( ; ) ; ) 6 . R4 suggests that the direct policy e¤ects on the intensive and extensive margins can be quantitatively small. Now consider the indirect policy e¤ects on the margins. For example, it is clear from Figure 2 that in ‡ation increases the choice of z for every value of , which then leads to higher choices of b and q since both are increasing functions of z. Figure 3 reports the overall e¤ects of in ‡ation on the intensive and the extensive margins under various tax rates. Panel A shows the intensive margin, i.e. average quantity per trade in the frictional market, and panel B shows the extensive margin, i.e. volume of transactions in the frictional market. To summarize:
R6. In ‡ation has a positive overall e¤ect on both the intensive and the extensive margins. In contrast, the tax rate has a negative overall e¤ect on both of the margins.
Aggregate output and labor. Figure 4 presents the policy e¤ects on aggregate output (Panel A) and aggregate labor (Panel B). The …rst column of panel A shows the e¤ects of in ‡ation on output given = 0:05. In ‡ation has no e¤ect on output in the general-good sector because it has no e¤ect on y ( ). In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on output in the special-good sector. This follows from the positive e¤ects of in ‡ation on intensive and extensive margins. Together, in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on aggregate output (and thus aggregate consumption since there is no investment in this model). 7 The …rst column of Panel B documents similar e¤ects of in ‡ation on aggregate labor. The second column of Panel A illustrates the e¤ects of income taxation on output given = 1:01. Income taxation reduces output in both sectors and thus aggregate output, which is a direct result of the negative e¤ect of taxation on intensive and extensive margins. Similarly, in ‡ation also has a negative e¤ect on aggregate labor, as is shown in the second column of Panel B. Panel C presents further policy e¤ects on aggregate output in the special-good sector.
R7. In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on aggregate output/consumption and aggregate labor, while income taxation has a negative e¤ect on both.
Equilibrium prices. Figure 5 shows the e¤ect of in ‡ation on the price distribution in the frictional market at various tax rates. In ‡ation increases both the average price level and the coe¢ cient of variation of prices. Given = 0, Figure 6 demonstrates the price distributions under = 0:995 and = 1:2. The horizontal axis is the price and the vertical axis is the fraction of shops o¤ering a particular price. As in ‡ation goes up, a smaller proportion of shops are o¤ering the higher end of the equilibrium prices. In particular, the fraction of shops o¤ering the highest equilibrium price is about 55% when = 0:995 and this number drops to 28% when = 1:2. This is driven by the positive extensive margin e¤ect of in ‡ation. All households increase their spendings z and their choices of b as in ‡ation increases. To meet this demand, …rms must set up more shops in all submarkets to ensure a higher matching probability for buyers. As is indicated in Figure 2 , the function b (z) is concave. As all households increase their spendings z, a low-spending household's choice of b is catching up with that of a high-spending household. That is, the di¤erences in the choice of b across households tend to shrink. As a result, the di¤erences in the measure of shops across submarkets also wither, which explains the positive relationship between in ‡ation and price dispersion. 8 Furthermore, income tax reduces average price for a given in ‡ation rate. However, taxation does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of variation of prices. Figure 7 shows the policy e¤ects on aggregate markups. Panels A and B document the aggregate markups of price over marginal cost, respectively for the both sectors and for the special-good sector alone. Panels C and D present results in a similar fashion, although using a di¤erent measure of the markup. In particular, it is the markup of price over average cost. R8 summarizes the above …ndings:
R8. In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on the average real price and the price dispersion in the frictional market. Income taxation has a negative e¤ect on the average price, but does not have a signi…cant impact on price dispersion. In ‡ation increases the aggregate markup of the aggregate economy, but decreases that of the frictional market. 9 Income taxes increase the aggregate markup of both the aggregate economy and the frictional market alone. R9. In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on the normalized wage rate and a negative e¤ect on the real wage rate. The former e¤ect weakens as the tax rate arises. Income taxes have the opposite e¤ects, i:e: negative e¤ect on the normalized wage rate and positive e¤ect on the real wage rate.
Wealth distribution. Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of in ‡ation on wealth distribution at various tax rates. Here a household's wealth is interpreted as its beginning-of-period real 8 This is in line with some of the empirical evidence on price dispersion for the U.S. (e.g. Reinsdorf, 1994; Parsley, 1996; Debelle and Lamont, 1997) and for other countries such as Israel and Argentina (e.g. Van Hoomissen, 1988; Lach and Tsiddon, 1992; Tommasi, 1992) . There is also a theoretical literature that studies in ‡ation and price dispersion. Some of these models demonstrate a positive relationship between anticipated in ‡ation and price dispersion, e.g. Bénabou (1988 Bénabou ( , 1992a , Diamond (1993) , Peterson and Shi (2004) , Head and Kumar (2005) and Wang (2011) . In a search environment, Molico (2006) reports a negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on price dispersion. In contrast to the above literature, my model generates price dispersion through competitive search among heterogeneous agents. 9 There is no consensus in the empirical literature regarding the relationship between in ‡ation and markups. For example, Bénabou (1992b) …nds a negative correlation between in ‡ation and retail markups. money balances after receiving the government transfer T given by (40) . Therefore, the average wealth consists of aggregate savings, aggregate unspent balances and the transfer. As is indicated by Figure 2 , at a higher in ‡ation rate households choose to save less (lower h) and spend more (higher z) at a higher rate (higher b). Thus in ‡ation decreases aggregate savings. Its e¤ect on aggregate unspent balances can be ambiguous. On one hand, households plan on spending more, which means the level of unspent balances held by a household is also higher. On the other hand, households also choose to trade with a higher matching probability, which reduces the chance of holding an unspent balance across periods. Figure 2 seems to suggest that the e¤ect of matching probabilities can be quite small, suggesting that in ‡ation is likely to increase the aggregate unspent balances. The government transfer includes the monetary component to achieve money growth and the …scal component from taxation on labor income. Both components increase with in ‡ation. The former is because of money injection and the latter is because aggregate labor increases as in ‡ation rises (see panel B of Figure 4) . Overall, the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation dominates, which indicates that the negative impact of in ‡ation on savings can be the dominating force. Now consider the positive relationship between income taxation and average wealth. Also from Figure 2 , it is clear that households choose to save more (higher h) and spend less (lower z) at a lower rate (lower b). Moreover, higher tax rates reduce aggregate labor and thus the …scal component of government transfers. Altogether, the positive e¤ect of income taxation dominates, which again is likely to the result of the dominating e¤ect on household savings.
Panel B of Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of in ‡ation on the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth at various tax rates. Since all households receive the same amount of government transfers, wealth dispersion critically depends on the dispersion of household savings and that of unspent balances. A rise in in ‡ation tends to increase dispersion in household unspent balances (due to trading frictions) and decrease dispersion in household savings, which is suggested to a certain extent in Figure 2 by the changes in the functions z ( ) and h ( ) under various policy regimes. Nevertheless, as the tax rate rises, households increase savings, which allows the e¤ect of in ‡ation on savings to make a stronger presence. As is shown in Panel B of Figure 9 , the positive e¤ect of in ‡ation on dispersion in household unspent balances tends to dominate when the tax rate is low (e.g. = 0, = 0:01). At some intermediate tax rates, there can be a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and wealth dispersion (e.g. = 0:02, = 0:03). Then at higher tax rates, the negative e¤ect on savings dominates (see = 0:05, = 0:1 and = 0:2).
R10. In ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on average wealth while income taxation has a positive e¤ect on average wealth. At low tax rates, in ‡ation tends to increase wealth disper-22 sion. At intermediate tax rates, wealth dispersion …rst increases and then decreases with in ‡ation. Wealth dispersion decreases with in ‡ation at high tax rates.
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Income and consumption inequality. Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively report how in ‡ation a¤ects the coe¢ cients of variation of household disposable income and consumption, at various tax rates. The key …ndings are summarized in R11. In ‡ation reduces income inequality because of the redistributive e¤ect of lump-sum transfers to sustain money growth. This negative e¤ect strengthens with higher taxes because income taxation suppresses the incentives to supply labor. This accentuates the redistributive e¤ect of in ‡ation. Income taxation increases income inequality. One interpretation is that the negative impact of taxation on aggregate labor income overpowers its e¤ect on the variation of income. In ‡ation increases consumption inequality because it stimulates participation in the frictional market. Income taxation has little e¤ect on consumption inequality for the following reasons: On one hand, income taxation discourages participation in the frictional market, which reduces standard deviation of consumption. On the other hand, income taxation also reduces aggregate consumption. The two e¤ects end up cancelling each other out, possibly due to the quasi-linear preferences.
R11. In ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on income inequality. 11 This e¤ect gets stronger as the tax rate rises. Income taxation has a positive e¤ect on income inequality. In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on consumption inequality, 12 but income taxation does not have a signi…cant impact on consumption inequality.
Welfare. Figure 12 illustrates the e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare under various tax regimes. Welfare is de…ned as the weighted average of the life-time discounted value W . The key results are in R12. On one hand, in ‡ation helps increase output. On the other hand, in ‡ation reduces savings and increases consumption inequality. Without distortionary taxes, in ‡ation does not improve welfare. However, if imposed, taxes have a negative in ‡uence on output and also make households over-accumulate assets. In this case, some in ‡ation can help counteract the e¤ects of distortionary taxation and thus improve welfare. The higher the tax rate, the more prominent the positive e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare.
R12. The welfare-maximizing policy is the Friedman rule ( = 0:995) and zero income taxation. Nevertheless, if income taxation is imposed ( > 0), there tends to be a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and welfare. The welfare-improving role of in ‡ation strengthens as the tax rate increases.
The results in R1-R12 are robust to variation of parameter values satisfying restrictions described in (36) and satisfying that the labor choices of all households are strictly positive. Moreover, these results are also robust to variation of the distribution F ( ), e.g. leftskewed and right-skewed distributions, as well as symmetric distributions other than the uniform distribution considered in (36) . Results on the robustness analysis are available upon request. Note that in ‡ation has no e¤ect on activities in the frictionless market whatsoever. Therefore, all of the non-trivial e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation summarized in R6-R12 are due to trading frictions. This demonstrates that the trading frictions play an important role in reconciling empirical observations on macro performance. Furthermore, a mechanism generating real responses along both the intensive and extensive margins, such as competitive search considered in this paper, can bring extra insights on the e¤ects of monetary and …scal policy.
Conclusion
I have constructed a tractable framework of competitive search that endogenously generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. This model is used to study the long-run e¤ects of in ‡ation on various aspects of the macro performance, and to study whether the …scal regime matters for such e¤ects. Competitive search brings two important features to the model. First, the model allows for endogenous response of output along the extensive margin, as well as the intensive margin that the literature typically focuses on. Second, competitive search signi…cantly improves the tractability of analysis because it makes the individual decision problem independent of the endogenous wealth distribution. The key …ndings from quantitative analysis are the following:
First, in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on aggregate output, consumption inequality, average price and price dispersion. In the meanwhile, in ‡ation reduces average wealth and income inequality.
Second, income taxation has a negative e¤ect on the level of output, average price, and a positive e¤ect on the level of average wealth and income inequality. It has little e¤ect on the respective relationships between in ‡ation and output, average price and average wealth. Nor does income taxation have any signi…cant impact on price dispersion or consumption inequality. Nevertheless, taxation strengthens the negative relationship between in ‡ation and income inequality.
Third, policy e¤ect on wealth inequality is more complex. At low tax rates, in ‡ation tends to increase wealth dispersion. At intermediate tax rates, there can be a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and wealth dispersion. At higher tax rates, wealth dispersion decreases with in ‡ation.
Finally, in ‡ation can improve welfare when income taxation is imposed. The higher the tax rate, the stronger the welfare-improving role of in ‡ation. Therefore, it is important to coordinate monetary and …scal policies. The optimal in ‡ation rate increases if the tax rate has been raised, and vice versa. For part (i), de…ne the left-hand side of (17) as LHS (b) and impose x = z:
where q is given by (18) with x = z. It is straightforward to derive that
where (18) 
Given all the above results, condition (26) implies that there exists z > 0 such that b > 0. Furthermore, the above results imply that the policy function b (z) is unique, which further implies that q (z) is also unique given (18) . Given x = z, (16) implies
Therefore, for z such that b > 0,
This implies that an increase of z shifts the entire function LHS (b) upwards. Because
with equality. Total di¤erentiating (17) by z yields
Given b 0 (z) > 0 and Assumption 1, rearranging the above yields q 0 (z) > 0 for all z such that b > 0. Given b > 0, one can derive that
This is because b 0 (z) > 0 and the trade surplus, u (q (z)) zE ( ), is strictly positive given b > 0, and also condition (38) . Obviously, b (z) is strictly decreasing in E ( ), given the results about LHS (b) in part (ii). Then (28) implies that q (z) is strictly increasing in I now prove part (iii) and the di¤erentiability ofṼ together. If b (z) = 0 for all z, then obviouslyṼ (z) is di¤erentiable. Now consider the case where there exists z such that b (z) > 0, i.e., condition (26) holds. It is obvious that B (z) is di¤erentiable for all z such that b (z) > 0. Consider z such that b (z) > 0. Recall that a concave function has both lefthand and right-hand derivatives (see Royden, 1988, pp113-114) . LetṼ 0 (z ) andṼ 0 (z + ) be the left-hand and right-hand derivatives, respectively. SupposeṼ Recall the normalized wage rate w as given in (33) . Note that all the policy functions in the right-hand side of (33) are independent of w . It is obvious that w > 0 exists. Therefore, a stationary equilibrium exists and is characterized by w . It is unique if and only if the lottery choices With policies, the de…nition of a stationary equilibrium must satisfy one more condition that the government balances its budget every period. Therefore, the total dollar amount of transfers that a household receives in a period consists of the transfer for monetary policy purposes and the transfers for …scal policy purposes. For money growth, the household receives a dollar amount of ( 1) M , which is equivalent to ( 1) M= (wM 0 ) = ( 1) = (w ) units of labor. For income taxation, the amount of the government transfer in terms of labor units is LS. Altogether, the total real transfer is given by
For part (iv) of the equilibrium de…nition, the market-clearing condition for the generalgood market is
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is aggregate demand for labor, LD, is equal to aggregate supply of labor, LS. Consider LD …rst. A household's realization of determines the money balance z ( ). Given this money balance, the resulted money balance after lotteries is L i (z ( )), i = 1; 2, which takes place with probability i (z ( )). Thus the measure of such households is N b = i (z ( )) dF ( ). The measure of shops corresponding to the households holding L i (z ( )) is given by
which is derived from b= (b) = N s =N b given the constant-return-to-scale matching technology. Then for each shop, the expected labor demand is k + (q) (b), which is used to compute the aggregate demand for labor in the frictional markets. Note that such calculation is also valid for cases when some households do not use lotteries and when
is the same for some di¤erent realizations of . Thus, LD is given by
The …rm's zero-pro…t condition (3) implies that for i = 1; 2,
Then (42) can be transformed to
The aggregate labor supply is given by
where G a (m) is the money distribution at the beginning of a period. Recall l (m; ) from (32) given t g = 0. Thus,
Use (40) to substitute for T in the above. Also recall the constraint for the household's lottery choice,
Because m is a household's money balance at the beginning of a period, it consists of the money balance carried over for savings purposes and if any, the transactional balance unspent due to matching frictions. Thus,
The labor-market clearing requires LD = LS. Thus (43), (44) and (45) together solve for the normalized wage rate in the steady state:
Note that the formula in (33) is clearly given by setting = 0 in the above equation. Given that the labor market clears, the money market clears by Walras'law. Note that (w ) Figure 8 . In ‡ation and wage rates 13 There appears to be considerable ‡uctuations in this graph. However, such " ‡uctuations" are only generated by computational imprecision due to gridding and do not bear real economic meaning. This also applies other graphs in this section that display some irregularities.
14 For = 0, the graph shows the values of the normalized wage rate divided by 5. : discount factor; U (y): a household's utility of consuming y units of general goods; u (q): a household's utility of consuming q units of special goods; l: a household's wage income in a period; z: a household's balance to spend in the frictional market; h: a household's balance for savings; (q): labor input needed for producing q units of special goods; : a household's random disutility per unit of labor; F ( ): CDF of the random shock ; k: a …rm's cost of operating a shop in a frictional submarket, measured in labor units; N s , N b : numbers of shops and buyers, respectively, in a submarket; M (N b ; N s ): aggregate number of matches in a submarket with N b buyers and N s shops; s = (b): primitive matching function; M : aggregate stock of money per capita in a period; p: price of general goods in terms of labor; w: normalized wage rate; nominal wage rate divided by the aggregate money stock; m: a household's real money balance, measured in terms of labor; x: money spending in a frictional trade, measured in labor; W (m; ): a household's value at the beginning of the …rst sub-period; V (z; h): a household's value at the beginning of the second sub-period; V (z): a household's value of the lottery choice; B(z): a household's value immediately after the lottery takes place but before trading in the frictional submarket; L i : the realization in a lottery; i : the probability with which L i is realized in the lottery; z 0 : the prize in a lottery participated by the households with low balances of z;
: money growth rate; : proportional income tax rate; T : lump-sum government transfer.
